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Introduction
The Australian Government is undertaking 
a comprehensive review of homeland and 
border security arrangements in Australia. 
The review, being undertaken by the former 
Secretary of the Department of Defence, 
Ric Smith, will report midyear.
In response to 9/11, there’s been 
considerable planning and investment of 
resources by the Australian Government 
focused on Australia’s capacity to prevent, 
respond to and recover from a major 
terrorist attack in our homeland. The focus 
on disrupting the planning of terrorist 
acts, or to disrupt them once underway, 
Floodwaters surround the town of Coraki after severe storms caused much of northern New South Wales to be declared a natural disaster zone, 
8 January 2008. Thousands of people isolated by raging floodwaters may have to be rescued by the State Emergency Service as helicopters 
continue to fly in supplies. AFP/AAP/Eddie Safarik © 2008 AFP
It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent,  
but the one most responsive to change.
Charles Darwin
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has obscured the potential for much greater 
deaths and casualties caused by extreme 
natural disasters and therefore the need for 
an all-hazards risk approach in understanding 
and responding to all associated risks: if 
Cyclone Larry had impacted on Cairns in 
March 2006, not Innisfail, in conjunction with 
a king tide and storm surge this could have 
been Australia’s Hurricane Katrina.1
A terrorism attack in Australia remains 
without question a distinct possibility, but 
assessed against the risk of probability, we 
have more to fear from natural disasters, 
which are not exceptional events.
The focus on disrupting the planning 
of terrorist acts, or to disrupt them 
once underway, has obscured the 
potential for much greater deaths 
and casualties caused by extreme 
natural disasters …
Because of the scale and speed of such 
natural events they have similar potential to 
other security challenges that threaten our 
normal way of life across significant areas 
of the country. As was recently noted in the 
United Kingdom’s national security strategy 
paper, the approach to these extreme events 
in terms of assessing and monitoring the 
risks, learning from experiences at home and 
overseas, developing capabilities to minimise 
the risks and the potential harm, absorbing 
whatever harm occurs and then returning 
to normality as soon as possible is similar 
to the approach to other national security 
challenges, including terrorism.2
Around $10 billion has been invested 
since 11 September 2001 on Australia’s 
counter-terrorism programs, compared 
to around $500 million in managing the 
potential consequences of a large-scale 
natural disaster occurring in Australia.3 
More importantly, when it comes to time 
spent planning and resources applied to 
managing risks on an all-hazards basis, there 
hasn’t been sufficient effort to engage the 
Australian community on what Australians 
can do for themselves in the face of high 
consequence events like terrorism and 
extreme natural disasters.
Sustaining a prosperous nation 
rests on ensuring that Australia can 
withstand the impact from a range of 
hazards, both deliberate and natural.
Sustaining a prosperous nation rests on 
ensuring that Australia can withstand 
the impact from a range of hazards, both 
deliberate and natural. Disasters of all kinds 
can’t always be averted but we must do all 
we can to prevent, respond and recover from 
disruptive events.4 That requires our leaders 
engaging the Australian people in a national 
resilience program to secure Australia.
Why resilience?
Resilience is derived from the Latin word 
resilio, meaning ‘to jump back’. In the field 
of material sciences, for example, resilience 
refers to the ability of a material to recover 
its original shape following a deformation. 
The concept of resilience can be applied 
to individuals, organisations, sectors and 
communities. These units integrate to create 
a resilient society.
Overall it’s about measuring how our society 
can adapt to a changed reality and capitalise 
on new possibilities offered. For industry, 
resilience is about being able to keep on 
working independently and interdependently 
in the face of disaster and to use the 
disruptive event as a focus to strengthen and 
grow the organisation. A resilient company 
will return to pre-disruption profits faster and 
enhance its reputation.5
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The national capacity to respond productively 
to significant changes that disrupt the 
expected pattern of events is, however, 
coming under greater strain. No matter 
what the disturbance, Australians now 
appear to feel that somehow they will 
be looked after, even when caught up in 
overseas emergencies, such as the Lebanon 
war in 2006. We seem to have generated 
a community view of: ‘don’t worry, 
someone else will come and get you and 
fix the damage.’
Too many in our community believe that 
calling 000 will generate an instant response: 
‘just-in-time’ shopping with instant access to 
banking, goods and services has encouraged a 
sense of public complacency.
We’ve come to believe that our workforce of 
emergency volunteers will always be there 
to manage all hazards. Compounding this 
misperception is that the community seems 
to believe that the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) will also respond to any disaster, despite 
the fact such a response isn’t viewed as core 
business by the ADF.
The complexity and the tightly coupled 
nature of the systems that support both our 
economy and our society mean that it’s very 
difficult for individuals and some business 
organisations to comprehend that they might 
be affected, or much less, be in a situation to 
reduce losses and recover from disasters.
Our ability to respond to a large-scale 
catastrophic event, which severely impacted 
on critical infrastructure for lengthy periods 
or caused a massive injury toll or loss of life, 
hasn’t been truly tested. The experience of 
the 2002 Bali bombings (88 Australians dead 
and 66 critically injured) has, however, left the 
unfortunate impression on our community, 
that as a nation we can deal with all range of 
disasters, including something on the scale of 
a Hurricane Katrina.
In the case of the built environment, 
resilience is about designing structures 
that can withstand even a strong hit, or 
hardening what can’t be quickly fixed. And 
for elements of our critical infrastructure that 
require the continuity of networked systems 
such as transport, energy, banking and 
communications it’s about having systems 
that can be activated should there be a break 
or interruption.
… resilience is about designing 
structures that can withstand even a 
strong hit, or hardening what can’t be 
quickly fixed.
A resilient community has the capacity to 
withstand a disaster and its consequences, 
return to its pre-disaster state quickly and 
learn from the disaster experience to achieve 
higher levels of functioning. For individuals, 
it’s about the ability to function at a level far 
greater than expected given the individuals 
previous experiences.
When things go wrong, Australians have 
traditionally shown an ability to bounce back 
quickly: indeed it’s one of our great strengths 
as a nation. We are known worldwide for 
having a ‘can-do’ spirit and soldiering on in 
times of need. Australians don’t like to see 
themselves as simply passive victims.
Whether it’s the way we’ve responded to the 
challenges of severe economic downturns, 
wars, or the impacts of frequent bushfires, 
droughts and floods, we have been able to 
self-reliantly bounce back from significant 
disruption. We’ve traditionally used such 
events to strengthen our overall community 
by reacting flexibly to restore routine 
functioning. And we have a strong tradition 
of volunteerism.
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of our health response systems would 
almost certainly be rapidly overwhelmed. 
There’s a clear need for the health sector 
to have much greater integration in 
emergency management planning with a 
significant emphasis on volunteer health and 
community service based agencies to ensure 
integration occurs. And the physical assets in 
Australian hospitals don’t meet US hospital 
preparedness benchmarks for mass casualty 
incidents. In fact, we don’t have minimum 
disaster preparedness standards for our 
health system.8
At the same time as our community and 
individual preparedness to absorb negative 
impacts from unexpected dangers and 
to recover from these appears in decline, 
more Australians are shifting to sea-change 
localities, often with limited infrastructure 
response capacity to deal with increased 
storm and other weather extremes arising 
from climate change. ‘Tree-changers’ moving 
to areas that are fire prone face similar 
consequences, including those related 
to environmental challenges. And with 
an ageing population in these localities 
it’s harder to recruit emergency services 
volunteers to respond to hazard stress. In 
terms of raw numbers, people over 50 in 
Australia will increase from 2.5 million in 
2006 to 3.3 million in 2011 and to more than 
10 million by 2050. Fewer people are willing 
to step up to the plate, nor are they likely to 
be physically able to participate in voluntary 
emergency organisations.
The nature of post-disaster inquiries have 
aggravated the problems here in the way 
they have taken a heavy toll on the parties 
under review.9 Inquiries have become very 
intrusive for operational first responders, 
including volunteers. As a result, trained 
people who could undertake important roles 
as first responders aren’t taking up key posts 
because of the potential for public criticism 
and litigation.
We’ve been very lucky in Australia in not 
having to face the ‘Big One’—the catastrophic 
event that produces extensive casualties 
and loss of life, widespread damage, large 
numbers of displaced people, significant 
business failure, extreme relief and recovery 
costs that simply overwhelms our capacity 
to respond.6 Examples might include a major 
earthquake on one of our big cities, a tsunami 
hitting a major population centre on the east 
coast, a major flood or dam burst in a densely 
populated area, or significant flooding from 
the impact of a major cyclone combined with 
storm surge that affects both urban and 
regional centres simultaneously.
There’s little information on the record to 
generate public confidence that we really 
know what the breakpoint is in terms of 
surge and sustainability. History isn’t a guide 
here. Cyclone Tracy devastated Darwin on 
25 December 1974 with 65 dead, 150 major 
injuries and air evacuation of around 30,000, 
many deciding not to return to Darwin. 
The Granville rail smash in 1977 resulted in 
83 deaths and 213 hospitalised. We managed 
these events effectively. On a comparative 
scale of other events which have impacted 
other countries and regions, these two cases 
are small scale.
… the physical assets in Australian 
hospitals don’t meet US hospital 
preparedness benchmarks for mass 
casualty incidents.
Two reports published last year raised 
serious doubts about our health system’s 
capacity to handle a large mass casualty 
situation—something on the scale of 
the London bombings—70 deaths and 
600 injuries, 400 hospitalised and needing 
surgery.7 If a large-scale influenza pandemic 
occurred in Australia and spread more quickly 
than anticipated then the surge capacity 
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natural or human-caused events without 
suffering devastating damage or changes to 
our quality of life.
In 2005, the Australian Institution of 
Engineers issued the Australian Infrastructure 
Report Card that examined key national 
infrastructure sectors. The report found 
many of the key sectors require immediate 
attention to mitigate problems arising from 
increasing demand. Parts of Australian 
infrastructure are ageing and current funding 
commitments are either inadequate or yet 
to be identified, to support the substantial 
costs required for renewal or replacement. 
Physical growth and social attitudes that have 
developed around ownership and usage of 
private vehicles are placing demands on the 
road system that are becoming unsustainable 
and are placing high costs on government.
Older bridges in some of our major 
cities and in regional Australia are 
vulnerable to cracking because of lack 
of maintenance.
The highly decentralised nature of Australia’s 
population means our transport industry is 
pivotal to the effective functioning of the 
economy. Our rail network suffers from 
similar congestion related problems and sea 
ports have limited ability for expansion due 
to urban encroachment. There’s an absence 
of efficient interconnections between various 
state power grids and current distribution 
networks are not easily able to accept power 
from renewable resources.
Older bridges in some of our major cities 
and in regional Australia are vulnerable to 
cracking because of lack of maintenance. 
But the downsizing of some states’ public 
works departments has led to a shortage 
of civil engineers to properly maintain 
At the local level the problem of self-reliance 
in the face of unanticipated disasters is 
made more complicated by the extent to 
which basic assets and services are no longer 
owned and managed by local government. 
These activities and assets have been 
progressively outsourced and sold off by 
governments to private contractors, who as 
profit-making institutions haven’t always 
taken into consideration the need to readily 
activate assets in critical times of need. Local 
community infrastructure, such as halls and 
sporting venues which provide a means for 
community engagement and participation, 
fundamental to maintaining overall 
community resilience, is deteriorating.
Approximately 30% of councils in Australia 
are under severe financial stress with asset 
management and improvements urgently 
required. Work commissioned by the 
Australian Local Government Association 
suggests there’s a national backlog of 
$14.5 billion in local government infrastructure 
renewal work.
Climate change will compound 
the risks of disruption and have a 
direct influence on the type, scale 
and frequency of disasters and 
emergencies Australia will face …
Climate change will compound the risks of 
disruption and have a direct influence on the 
type, scale and frequency of disasters and 
emergencies Australia will face, including 
increased flooding, more frequent and intense 
storms, lightning events and bushfires. More 
coastal zone residential developments are 
simply increasing these risks.10
Australia’s national infrastructure more 
generally is under stress and this complicates 
the ability of the nation to withstand extreme 
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as Secure NSW and the Let’s look out for 
Australia campaign are worthwhile, in order 
to enhance Australians capacity to prevent 
and recover from a human-induced disaster 
in the shortest time and with minimal 
assistance, we require a much more vigorous 
strategy to engage ordinary Australians on 
what they should be doing in the face of a 
range of risks and shocks. For example, we still 
haven’t conducted a public communications 
campaign to inform householders on 
how they could cope if a human influenza 
pandemic occurred. Australians, if asked by 
their leaders, will be supportive of a call to 
respond productively to significant changes 
that disrupt the expected pattern of events 
and adapt to new operating conditions. 
Australians, more often than not, respond 
well when presented with a challenge.
… in order to enhance Australians 
capacity to prevent and recover 
from a human-induced disaster in 
the shortest time and with minimal 
assistance, we require a much more 
vigorous strategy to engage ordinary 
Australians on what they should be 
doing in the face of a range of risks 
and shocks.
A fundamental shift is required, however, 
in moving from a ‘need-to-know’ national 
security culture to a ‘need-to-share’ resilience 
culture to get the community fully engaged 
in understanding what our actual state of 
preparedness is and asking the community to 
be better prepared. A well-prepared public and 
a focus on information that will assist at the 
community level leads to national resilience.13 
A more resilient Australia will be more able 
to absorb large shocks without significantly 
changing our fundamental way of life.
these structures. Experts suggest we need 
to be using sensors much more in order 
to continuously monitor these structures. 
Storm water infrastructure is old, and there’s 
a lack of funds for maintenance, repairs and 
renewals. This is of particular concern: flood 
damage is the most expensive source of 
natural disasters in Australia.
The infrastructure backlog in Australia is 
generally thought to be about $150 billion. 
The OECD ranks Australia twentieth out 
of twenty-five countries when it comes 
to investment in public infrastructure as a 
proportion of national income.
While we have seen these cross pressures 
on the nation’s ability to bounce back from 
disasters of all kinds, we have yet to see a 
genuine effort by our national security leaders 
to engage the public to frankly and openly 
inform them on where we face major threats, 
how best the community should better 
protect itself and improve risk reduction 
measures. In fact the reverse is true: a range 
of government reports relating to Australia’s 
ability to respond to large-scale emergencies 
have been embargoed on the grounds that to 
share that information with the public would 
only serve to frighten people.11
It’s interesting to compare here the recent 
commitment by the British Government to 
publish later this year, and update annually, 
a national-level risk register setting out the 
official assessment of the likelihood and 
potential impact of a range of different 
risks that may directly affect the United 
Kingdom and the safety and well-being of 
its citizens. The officially stated reason for 
such an initiative is to help local authorities, 
communities, businesses, and others in 
preparing for emergencies.12
In the face of possible disasters, it’s 
Australians that should be at the centre of 
any societal resilience program. While the 
national security hotline, and websites such 
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appointments with specific responsibility, 
it’s unclear exactly who leads on what’s 
needed from the community as a part of any 
response and recovery situation. We need 
greater clarity on the precise management 
and coordination arrangements in the 
case, for example, of a devastating tsunami 
impacting on southeast Australia or a large 
earthquake which impacts on one of our 
major capital cities.
We need greater clarity on the precise 
management and coordination 
arrangements …
The Commonwealth agency seen to be 
responsible for this, Emergency Management 
Australia (EMA), has no mandate, legislation 
or Cabinet endorsement with which to take 
command. The delivery of EMA functions 
for the most part is the result of goodwill on 
behalf of other agencies. This is clearly not a 
satisfactory situation.
Towards resilience
There are nine initial steps that government, 
industry, the community as well as individuals 
can adopt to build resilience in the face of 
disturbances, unpredictability and complexity.
Establish clear leadership and coordination
The states and territories have constitutional 
responsibilities for emergency management 
and control most of the functions essential 
for effective disaster prevention, response 
and recovery. There’s still some uncertainty, 
however, on who will be in charge in the 
situation of a major national disaster in 
Australia and how the response would be 
coordinated across borders.
There doesn’t appear to be a single point 
of Commonwealth tasking which can 
authoritatively provide the Prime Minister 
the combined picture of emergent needs 
and progress on response actions. In the 
absence of agreed national emergency 
management legislation, which would outline 
the accountability trail and point to key 
A motorist rides a motorcycle past a fishing ship still stranded on top of houses in Banda Aceh December 26, 2006. Thousands of people lit candles, visited 
mass graves and observed two minutes of silence on Tuesday two years after an unprecedented tsunami pulverised villages along the Indian Ocean and 
killed 230,000 people. © Tarmizy Harva/Reuters/Picture Media
8 Taking a punch: Building a more resilient Australia
There’s meant to be one overarching 
Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency 
Management (MCPEM). But it meets as 
two separate ministerial councils—the 
MCPEM and another specifically on 
emergency management matters (the 
MCPEM-EM). Both are chaired by the Federal 
Attorney-General and mostly attended by the 
same minister from each jurisdiction.19
This should be rationalised into one 
ministerial council and supported by 
one national committee structure by 
amalgamating the NCTC, the AEMC 
and the Critical Infrastructure Advisory 
Council (CIAC).20
One of the first tasks of a newly constituted 
high-level national committee structure 
would be to set in place the priorities 
for addressing resilience improvement 
measures.21 Such activity should be under the 
oversight of one ministerial council, not the 
current two, and provide annual reporting 
to the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) on progress.
Linked to this measure is the importance of 
having a single incident management system 
for command and control of emergencies, 
which can be adapted quickly from the 
routine to a nationally declared incident.
Currently there are many systems across 
policing and emergency authorities. If 
these were harmonised under a common 
approach it would enable all agencies to 
contribute through appropriate access and 
generate greater community confidence 
and resilience.22
And there’s the related issue of 
warnings—we still don’t yet have an 
appropriate, effective, timely national 
community information and warning system 
that would be capable of being used in the 
lead up to, occurrence of, and recovery from 
disasters. Recent improvements to tsunami 
There needs to be an instrument of delegation 
issued by the federal government, with the 
constitutional agreement of jurisdictions. 
The authority would need to be in two 
parts: one, in respect of directing action 
within the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction; 
and two, when the event was such that 
a state or states agreed that the severity 
warranted overall command and control by 
the Commonwealth.14
We should introduce one national 
framework to manage and coordinate 
any significant disaster …
We should introduce one national framework 
to manage and coordinate any significant 
disaster, including an act of terrorism, by 
building on the efforts of the National 
Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC)15 but 
focusing on an all-hazards perspective. At 
the moment, terrorism is given the priority: 
the Australian Emergency Management 
Committee (AEMC) is Australia’s peak 
consultative emergency management forum 
and it’s self-funded.16 The NCTC, on the 
other hand, has a federal budget of around 
$15 million per annum for meetings, exercising 
and equipment upgrades.
The current Director General of EMA correctly 
noted last year that the differences between 
terrorism and other kinds of natural and 
technological emergencies are ‘not so great 
as to cause us to manage them outside 
of the arrangements used to manage all 
other emergencies’.17
While in the case of a national terrorist 
situation the Australian Government 
determines policy and strategies18, as noted 
above, this role isn’t replicated for natural 
disasters or large-scale industrial accidents 
that cause catastrophic damage.
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The Office of Emergency Services 
Commissioner, in partnership with Telstra, 
ABC Radio, the Department of Sustainability 
and the Environment, Victoria’s emergency 
services and the Shires of Yarra Ranges and 
Northern Grampians and their respective 
communities, trialled and evaluated the 
effectiveness of innovative spatial and 
telecommunications technology to deliver 
public warning information. The trial took 
place between October 2004 through 
September 2005.
The trial was designed to incorporate 
Victoria’s emergency management 
arrangements and to deliver timely public 
warning information simultaneously 
to large numbers of households and 
businesses using a telephone message. The 
ABC Radio network was used as the major 
secondary source of information which 
participating residents were encouraged to 
access following delivery of the CIWS trial’s 
automated telephone messages.
The trial sought to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of public warning information 
and its links to public safety and the 
effectiveness of using a public broadcasting 
medium (ABC Radio) as a secondary 
information source.
The CIWS evaluation findings concluded 
that when people have a level of planning 
preparedness knowledge about emergency 
events, in combination with a realistic 
perception of their risk and a multi-faceted 
communication network, then a telephone 
emergency warning message is more 
likely to trigger appropriate decisions and 
behaviours which are likely to increase 
their safety and confirm their self-reliance 
to be prepared. The evaluation found that 
even if a telephone ‘warning’ message 
is only partially heard, its value for an 
informed and prepared community would 
still be high because it represented only 
one source of trusted information and 
planning within that community’s total 
approach to information and community 
safety preparedness.
People with limited understanding and 
awareness of their emergency risk and 
community safety, and who had not 
considered preparation and planning for 
emergency events, were consequently more 
likely to be wholly dependent on a telephone 
emergency warning message to determine 
their subsequent responses and behaviours.
Importantly, in these situations, rather 
than triggering increased self reliance and 
informed decision making, the telephone 
message is more likely to become a source 
of information which could increase their 
uncertainty, lack of preparedness and reduce 
their ability to contribute to having a shared 
responsibility of safety with the emergency 
service organisations.
The CIWS trial found that for community 
warning systems to be effective, the 
following elements were required:
• Telecommunications and geo-spatial 
technology needs to be seamlessly 
integrated within the operations of the 
emergency service organisation and 
to be incorporated as a component 
of state and national emergency 
management arrangements.
• The emergency services’ knowledge 
of community engagement, culture 
and demographics and public safety 
principles needs to be included within 
their community warning communication 
procedures and decision making.
• The development and delivery of a 
public safety awareness campaign must 
enable individuals and communities to 
understand the purpose of community 
warning and information procedures 
and the means to access emergency and 
safety information.
The Community Information and Warning System (CIWS) trial 
in Victoria
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particularly issues around evacuation plans, 
public communications, staging areas 
and disaster triage hospitals. COAG could 
be tasked with producing standards for 
whole-of-city preparedness. Although some 
work has commenced in this area, standards 
should be applied to all capital cities and large 
regional cities.
More generally, it would be useful for COAG 
to be provided with an annual summary of 
national capability on disaster preparedness 
and responses from all jurisdictions and 
the Commonwealth.
Factor in climate change
So-called freak weather is becoming more 
common, including cyclones, storms, floods, 
extreme temperature, drought and bushfires. 
The impact of these hazards as a result of 
climate change is escalating. Fire seasons, for 
example, are starting earlier and finishing 
later, and bushfires are increasing in severity, 
now referred to as mega wild fires.
Our emergency services and police will 
confront an increased frequency and 
volume of emergency calls.
It will be crucial for communities to build 
their resilience to adapt to the impacts of 
accelerated climate change. Our emergency 
services and police will confront an increased 
frequency and volume of emergency calls. 
Heatwave is the silent, hidden disaster 
impacting on the young, elderly and those 
with pre-existing illness. We will see the need 
for greater urban search and rescue efforts, 
with building and structural collapses caused 
by coastal erosion. This will have implications 
for the quantity and type of emergency 
response equipment needed. There will be 
significant evacuation and relocation of large 
numbers of people.
monitoring are commendable, but don’t help 
to convey the message of a potential impact 
to communities in the middle of the night.23 
The recent case of the impact of a chemical 
fire in Melbourne highlighted this problem.24
There must be an ‘end-to-end’ approach in 
thinking about warnings and getting this to 
the people who might be affected.
Some jurisdictions are attempting to 
develop systems in isolation (see box on 
previous page) but what’s required is a 
national, not disparate, approach. Using 
all aspects of geographic information, 
which is electronically synchronised with 
all phone subscribers (voice/text/email) 
should be considered to establish one 
Community Information Warning System. 
Telstra has assessed one possible approach 
at approximately 60 cents per person per 
annum, a $14m investment. Developing this 
initiative will require the removal of barriers 
around commercial and privacy interests, 
especially in relation to spatial data.
Authorities would need to map the 
requirements of those with special 
needs in certain areas …
Authorities would need to map the 
requirements of those with special needs in 
certain areas: currently one in five Australians 
have some kind of disability. The system 
would be an ‘opt out’ arrangement, with 
members of the community receiving the 
warnings unless they expressly asked not to 
receive them.25 Funding a national warning 
system ought to be shared by the federal 
government and the jurisdictions.
And finally we need to recognise that 
Australia is one of the most urbanised 
countries in the world: we should give greater 
attention to whole-of-city preparedness, 
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with an increased number of simultaneous 
disaster relief missions. We may witness more 
anti-social behaviour, such as the looting 
that occurred in the aftermath of the recent 
Queensland floods. While looting during crises 
is most often needs-based, such behaviour 
will place more demands on police to 
maintain security. Just as our police conduct 
counter-terrorism drills, law enforcement 
agencies will need to undertake more weather 
exercises with local emergency services.26
In the face of climate change induced 
disasters, we will have to improve our 
cross-jurisdictional response that involves 
disaster planning, emergency services, health 
care and infrastructure providers.
Rethink the role of the ADF
The ADF can assist in disasters as and when 
required with air and ground transport 
capability, logistics capability, medical 
support, special chemical, biological and 
Emergency crews will confront more injuries 
due to the increased intensity of extreme 
events. The psycho-social costs will be 
ongoing: in the months after Cyclone Larry 
devastated the far north of the state, more 
than 300 Queensland children suffered critical 
incident stress. Community members with 
special needs will require greater involvement 
in emergency management. And the needs 
of children and the elderly need to be taken 
into account in managing mass disaster 
situations, as both are particularly vulnerable 
in these events.
Governments will need to 
climate-proof their infrastructure as 
they face these emergent threats.
Governments will need to climate-proof their 
infrastructure as they face these emergent 
threats. Rescue resources will be stretched 
In this false colour Satellite image Cyclone Larry is pictured at 2033GMT on March 19, 2006 as it crosses the coast of the Australian state of Queensland. 
Cyclone Larry crossed the coast as a category five cyclone, destroying homes, leaving hundreds homeless, thousands without power and causing hundreds 
of millions of dollars damage to agriculture. The satellite image was processed by the Bureau of Meteorology from data received from the geostationary 
meteorological satellite MTSAT-1R operated by the Japan Meteorological Agency. (Illustration by Japan Meteorological Agency via Getty Images)
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performed by military forces in some other 
countries. This is a force multiplier for civilian 
or state government emergency service air 
operations. Helicopter squadrons near our 
capital cities could be deployed to support 
police, emergency services and disaster 
management agencies.28
The Rudd Government has proposed 
to establish a new centre to focus on 
improving our military coordination with 
civil agencies on international missions. 
This body should look at developing a 
whole-of-nation capability for operations at 
home: civil–military cooperation is essential 
during the response to any catastrophic 
disaster scenario. And the military expertise in 
network centric warfare could be shared with 
first responders to develop network centric 
emergency management.29
Conduct realistic/no-notice exercises
Consider the following scenario occurring in 
a regional centre: a small structural collapse 
due to earthquake resulting in fifty killed, 
120 hospitalised with injuries ranging from 
spinal crush, internal organ bleeding, major 
fractures and severe burns.
It’s this sort of scenario which needs to be 
played out in realistic, no-notice exercises to 
test the adequacy of arrangements, not only 
in terms of surge capacity and capability but 
also planning, integration, cooperation and 
coordination of all our health and emergency 
response assets. We still haven’t undertaken 
tough and realistic testing of our existing 
health assets, (even by creative modelling and 
simulation), including what mobile mortuary 
means and skill sets are available. And we 
need to think more creatively about improving 
the capacity of our emergency responders to 
manage large-scale events (see box on the 
next page).
radiological response and urban search and 
rescue capabilities.27 Often communications 
can fail during emergencies, especially in 
events covering wide geographical areas. The 
military has the capability to rapidly establish 
a secure radio network linking operational, 
tactical and strategic commanders across the 
disaster zone.
We need to debunk the public 
expectation … that the ADF will 
always be ready and able to assist for 
a sustainable period.
We need to debunk the public expectation, 
however, that the ADF will always be ready 
and able to assist for a sustainable period. 
Most of the resources of our armed forces are 
committed to operational activities. If they 
are in Australia, they are strategically located 
in the northeast and west of the country, so 
when and if they can be released there are 
vast distances and large logistic challenges.
It would be timely, however, for the new 
Defence White Paper, which has been 
commissioned by Defence Minister Joel 
Fitzgibbon, to consider if contemporary 
approaches to securing the nation now 
require disaster response by our military to 
be regarded as core business, along with its 
war-fighting role and if so what would that 
mean for the selection of military equipment 
and dispersal and interoperability of military 
assets around Australia.
Current deployment of military helicopters 
around Australia, for example, is unbalanced, 
with most assets located near Brisbane 
and Townsville, with some in Sydney and 
Nowra, on the south coast of New South 
Wales. Water bombing to fight fires is a task 
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Get down to business
Some useful steps in tapping the resources 
of the private sector in emergencies have 
been undertaken by the banking sector and in 
the area of precinct security (see box on the 
next page).
But we need to investigate ways in which 
the resources of the private sector can be 
integrated into government emergency 
management arrangements at all levels to 
assist the provision of community needs 
in the initial response and to create an 
additional surge capacity. The private sector 
can move quickly, without the constraints of 
bureaucracy. The first radio installed on the 
Superdome in New Orleans was by FEDEX. 
Home Depot and Wal-Mart responded with 
thousands of staff to restore community 
infrastructure, while government officials 
debated what actions to be taken. The US 
Government has contracted FEDEX as a major 
logistics arm for future disasters.
We should analyse the regulatory and 
legislative framework within which 
emergency management services are 
provided to identify any impediments 
to developing public and business 
management partnerships.
A more pressing initiative should be 
to map for industry a regular timeline 
for the national emergency services 
capability requirements.
Emergency services need to engage the 
large operators, such as the Coles Group, 
Woolworths, Bunnings, Linfox, Westfield 
and similar-size providers of goods and 
services to the community. They also need 
to engage Engineers Australia (the peak 
national body for all engineering disciplines) 
Improving emergency 
medical response capacity
We should introduce an emergency 
medical system that sees firefighters, 
trained in basic life support, providing 
rapid response to medical emergencies 
in order to carry out life-saving 
interventions pending the arrival 
of paramedics.
The two service Australian system—
ambulance and fire—has hindered 
this approach. In 2000, however, the 
Melbourne Metropolitan Fire Brigade, 
in conjunction with the Metropolitan 
Ambulance Service (and in some 
areas the Country Fire Authority and 
volunteer firefighters), commenced 
an integrated emergency medical 
response program. This leveraged 
the rapid response times of the fire 
service and the clinical expertise of 
ambulance paramedics to provide 
better pre-hospital care.
Due to an ageing population, demands 
on Australian ambulance services are 
growing: by 2036 it’s predicted that 
one quarter of Australians will be over 
65. In most jurisdictions ambulance 
response times are deteriorating, 
having a direct effect on the chances 
of survival.
On the other hand, urban fire services 
are experiencing some reduction in the 
number of fires occurring in residential 
and commercial buildings, leaving 
some ‘down-time’. An opportunity 
exists to better utilise firefighters 
through the provision of rapid 
response to medical emergencies prior 
to the arrival of paramedics.
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EMA and state emergency management 
services should consider establishing 
Business Liaison Units to advance this 
agenda and business should be brought 
much more into emergency crisis centres. 
and Master Builders Australia (the major 
Australian building and construction industry 
association), organisations which will find 
many of the skills and resources in the private 
sector needed in a catastrophic disaster.
The Banking and Finance Infrastructure 
Assurance Advisory Group (BFAG) was 
formed in 2004 as part of the Trusted 
Information Sharing Network for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. Members 
include the major banks and insurance 
companies, the Australian Securities 
Exchange, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
and regulators. BFAG implements 
measures to strengthen the banking 
and finance sector’s ability to continue 
its role in the economy and meet its 
obligations to customers in the event of 
major disruption. This includes facilitating 
community access to cash for trade 
where electronic banking systems are 
either destroyed or cease to function 
for extended periods of time. Whilst for 
most natural disasters the process works 
well, during Cyclone Larry the banking 
sector experienced some difficulties in 
competing with the recognised services 
to re-establish facilities to provide cash 
which is an essential service for disaster 
affected communities.
BFAG has undertaken discussions with 
the Victorian and NSW police and 
emergency services on the establishment 
of cordons, duration of exclusion zones, 
forensic investigation and first responder 
processes. Financial organisations 
provided information on protecting staff 
and maintaining business operations. 
A major lesson from BFAG’s work is that 
the key to achieving resilience is having 
strong working relationships with all 
interdependent parties.
In late 2006 the NSW Police, in 
association with transport agencies and 
business, developed Transport Security 
Precinct Committees.
Inter-modal passenger precincts were 
identified as areas of specific security 
interest: there’s a convergence of 
passenger transport systems at a 
single location, mass movements of 
people at predictable times and places 
and significant commercial and/or 
residential operations.
There’s no single regulatory agency 
that has responsibility for the security 
operation of inter-modal passenger 
precincts. There is a need, therefore, 
to establish a designated authority to 
coordinate security planning across private 
and public sector owners and operators.
The NSW Ministry of Transport has 
established eleven precinct committees to 
develop strategies to prevent, respond and 
recover from security events that might 
impact on a precinct. They coordinate 
organisations within the precinct to 
ensure risk assessments are reviewed and 
emergency response arrangements are in 
place. They are chaired by NSW Police and 
comprise all public sector and business 
stakeholders that impact on the function 
of the precinct.
Improving resilience: the banking sector and precinct security
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cost if we had to fully fund our emergency 
management volunteer effort—if we had to 
pay the volunteers, including overheads—is 
in the order of $12 billion a year. There’s over 
500,000 emergency management volunteers 
in Australia. They are predominantly male, 
average age 47 years, with very few from 
Asian, Eastern European, Middle Eastern or 
indigenous backgrounds. How we reinvigorate 
and replace the ageing volunteer emergency 
workforce and get young people to step up 
will be a key challenge.
We need some clever ideas to attract, 
retain, recognise and protect these 
people to maintain Australia’s world 
standard in volunteer effort.
We need some clever ideas to attract, 
retain, recognise and protect these people 
to maintain Australia’s world standard 
in volunteer effort. This should include 
addressing volunteer costs in meeting 
A more pressing initiative should be to map a 
regular timeline for the national emergency 
services capability requirements for industry. 
This would be similar to the way Defence 
shares its long term defence capability 
requirements to industry, thereby enabling 
industry to participate and assess future 
business opportunities.
Key suppliers could cooperate to build an 
online virtual warehouse of relief supplies 
to assist responders to know where goods 
are in times of great need. Within their own 
organisations, business should develop 
the capability of resilience champions, and 
bring them together to enhance resilience 
thinking. Industry might consider sponsoring 
a resilience awards program.30
Support volunteers
To develop a more resilient Australia, we 
should recognise that a lot of our response 
and recovery effort is reliant on volunteers 
and the non-government sector. How we 
nurture and maintain this workforce will 
be a substantial challenge. The overall 
First aid service volunteers in action in Western Australia. Photo courtesy of St John Ambulance Australia
16 Taking a punch: Building a more resilient Australia
The investment for future emergency 
management capability for Australia lies in 
volunteerism—retaining and maintaining 
the half a million Australians who make 
this sacrifice.
Build robust infrastructure
The Rudd Government has announced 
Infrastructure Australia as its method 
to address Australia’s infrastructure 
requirements. Infrastructure Australia, chaired 
by Sir Rod Eddington, is a statutory advisory 
council with twelve members drawn from 
industry and government, including local 
government. The council’s immediate task 
will be to audit the nation’s infrastructure 
shortfalls and provide an infrastructure 
priority list to guide billions of dollars in public 
and private investment. Audits will focus 
on the adequacy, capacity and condition of 
nationally significant infrastructure, including 
transport, water, communications and energy.
In selecting projects, Infrastructure Australia 
should examine interdependencies in our 
infrastructure and take into account any weak 
points. There must be public confidence that 
the infrastructure selected will work, within 
certain parameters, consistently through time 
if we have a disturbance. A good start might 
be to re-examine the Longford gas explosion 
in 1998 and its impact on Victoria against a 
scenario of limited supply for one month in 
the middle of winter.
Common resilience criteria ought to be 
part of the selection criteria for projects 
in terms of their underlying soundness in 
design and structures: it’s much harder to 
retrofit resilience into infrastructure systems. 
Infrastructure Australia should have as part 
of its advisory team experts in building 
resilient infrastructure. Such an expert group 
could examine vulnerabilities related to 
possible projects.
training standards. Volunteers don’t want to 
be paid, but we ought to consider a scheme 
that reimburses basic personal expenses and 
provides some assistance with fuel, public 
transport charges or childcare support.
This could be considered on a cost-share 
basis between the Commonwealth and 
jurisdictions. The total average cost per 
volunteer is around $500 per year per active 
volunteer member.31 The total cost of such an 
initiative would be around $150m per annum.
Supporting volunteers in this way won’t be 
enough, however, if we don’t recognise the 
substantial costs volunteerism has on their 
employers (or the volunteers themselves 
if they are self-employed) in releasing 
individuals at short notice. Victoria has 
acknowledged this problem in 2007 and 
announced payroll tax exemptions for 
businesses that have employees away from 
work as volunteer firefighters.
But we need a national strategy similar 
to Defence support for employers and 
self-employed reservists whereby employers 
qualify for financial compensation if they 
face difficulties in releasing employees to 
undertake reserve duty.32
Given the regular deployments of emergency 
volunteers in support of community safety, 
often performed in urgent and dangerous 
circumstances, there’s a strong case that 
similar support should be made available for 
the employers of our emergency volunteers.
EMA might take a lead and bring employers 
of emergency service volunteers together 
through a network of Emergency Service 
Support Councils to inform employers of 
emergency service matters relevant to 
them. Employers could be invited to take 
part in emergency management exercises 
to familiarise them with the sort of training 
emergency service volunteers undertake.
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be done to make the information available 
to business in a useable form, even if it’s 
sanitised and provided in a secure way.33
There’s also an issue related to the resilience 
of built infrastructure for large gatherings 
of people. Owners of such facilities need 
to provide an environment of best practice 
across a range of security and safety 
requirements. Those who provide best 
practice on a voluntary basis ought to have 
a way to promote that best practice. At the 
same time, potential patrons should be able to 
make judgements on which venue is safe and 
secure. A ‘star’ type rating could be developed 
similar to that used for accommodation 
providers. In the energy sector, providers 
of appliances have a greenhouse rating 
system and houses are star rated for energy 
efficiency. A provider with good security, fire 
protection, emergency evacuation and close 
proximity to public transport might achieve 
a five star rating, where providers who didn’t 
meet the standards would receive a lesser 
rating. The rating could be reviewed and 
upgraded if extra work was carried out. If the 
condition of the venue decreased the star 
rating might drop.
Another possible approach would be to issue 
resilience impact statements as a way for 
resilience to be incorporated into designs. 
They would be developed along similar 
lines to environmental impact statements, 
but with a focus on robustness issues. This 
idea might be considered by the Australian 
Building Codes Board.
Engage the media
The National Emergency Protocol describes 
the communication arrangements between 
the Prime Minister, Premiers, Chief Ministers 
and the President of the Australian Local 
Government Association during a national 
emergency. This all-hazards protocol was 
designed to ensure leaders coordinate 
key messages to the public during a 
national emergency.
Emergency broadcasting will be 
critical in disasters …
Emergency broadcasting will be critical in 
disasters (see media section below). ABC Radio 
and television transmissions are made via 
transmitters and towers which are operated 
privately by Broadcast Australia. Not all 
the transmitters which serve high density 
populations in Australia have reliable back-up 
generators. The ABC Radio signals are delivered 
by satellite or land line, but no attempt has 
been made to ensure that all transmitters 
have two pathways, providing redundancy. 
If the Optus satellite network went down, all 
national ABC Radio networks and some local 
radio programs will be put out of action. If the 
Telstra lines are dug up by accident or in some 
other way interfered with, the local radio 
network in that region will be out of action. 
The federal government needs to ensure 
there’s redundancy in the local radio network 
to provide reliable emergency broadcasting.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Modelling 
and Analysis Program (CIPMA) is an initiative 
of the Attorney-General’s Department, 
working with CSIRO and Geoscience Australia, 
to protect critical infrastructure through 
modelling and simulating the dependency 
relationships of critical infrastructure systems. 
It provides an opportunity for owners and 
operators to understand interdependencies 
with other sectors and identify risks to the 
resilience of infrastructure.
CIPMA has, however, focused mainly to date 
on terrorism risk. It should be regarded much 
more as a cost–benefit tool to enhance 
business resilience across the spectrum of 
risks. There’s a tendency by business to view 
CIPMA only as part of the counter-terrorism 
world, not part of the world of enterprise risk 
management or broader economic security: 
that’s the context in which the feedback 
should be provided to business. More could 
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security officials with representatives of 
media organisations on a regular basis. The 
forum would increase confidence building 
between government and the media 
through developing awareness of each 
others’ responsibilities and by identifying 
ways to improve communication. And the 
media should participate both in emergency 
management and counter-terrorism exercises 
to build trust with crisis managers and 
first responders. The integration of media 
representatives into exercises will improve 
the preparedness of both journalists and 
first responders.
At the same time emergency agencies have 
to create trusting relationships with the 
community: some still withhold essential 
information, worrying that the community 
might panic. Providing information as it 
arrives assists the media with timeliness 
and thereby helps the community to take 
responsibility for its own behaviour.
When it comes to preparedness, the 
average Australian family has little 
concept of planning for a situation 
where they may have no access to 
food, water or power for three days 
or more.
Value family and individual preparation
Preparedness at the family and individual 
level is important. Take fire prevention as an 
example. Generally, people don’t perish in 
houses with sprinklers. The simple adaptation 
to fit sprinklers in all new homes coupled with 
cisterns which can capture storm water is one 
way to contribute to family resilience. 36
When it comes to preparedness, the average 
Australian family has little concept of 
planning for a situation where they may 
Communication is a critical issue for 
building community resilience and 
trust. It’s an area, however, where we 
could do better.
Communication is a critical issue for building 
community resilience and trust. It’s an area, 
however, where we could do better. There’s 
a need for the ‘talking head’, providing the 
calm operational perspective regularly to 
the public: saying what they know, what 
they are doing, explaining what is unknown 
and what the public should do and not do. 
The community would expect that in such a 
situation the Prime Minister and Premiers/
Chief Ministers would be united, but these 
leaders don’t possess, nor can they be 
expected to have, a first-hand appreciation of 
the total operational picture. So there’s also 
the need to promote strong local voices that 
are trusted and known in local areas.
Action should be formalised nationally with 
the ABC to be the approved emergency 
broadcaster with the ability to interrupt 
immediately any program to provide 
community advice on any aspect of a likely or 
resultant disaster.34 Extra funding needs to be 
provided to enable ABC Local Radio to provide 
live broadcasting throughout Australia at 
all times.35
A large number of people rely on television 
for their information during emergencies, 
with ‘crawlers’ providing alerts about weather 
and other emergencies. The ABC should be 
funded to provide ‘crawlers’ throughout 
its entire network at all times. At present it 
cannot reliably provide crawlers for more 
than a few hours each day in any state, except 
New South Wales.
The Australian Government should establish 
a strategic communications forum to bring 
together emergency management and 
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The MCPEM and the Housing, Community 
and Disability Services Ministerial Council 
should jointly progress these ideas.
Concluding remarks
The 9/11 Commission Report by the National 
Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States pointed to several kinds of 
failure in terms of governance with respect to 
problems in imagination, policy, capabilities 
and management.
An underlying theme of this paper is that it’s 
the first point that’s the most critical—failing 
to imagine what could happen, failing 
to anticipate and taking the necessary 
preventive measures.
In a dangerous world, there’s no national 
champion for resilience, even though 
developing national resilience may be 
the most effective approach to manage 
Australia’s exposure to an increasing number 
have no access to food, water or power for 
three days or more. We should consider 
the adoption of the New Zealand initiative, 
What’s the Plan Stan? where schools and 
communities are encouraged to plan on how 
they would cope in their homes without 
essentials and for how long.
Consideration should be given to making 
available in all supermarket checkouts, the 
recently produced emergency pantry list 
prepared by the Australian Food and Grocery 
Council which outlines the sorts of product 
and food items people should stock for urgent 
times of need.37
In terms of individual resilience, consideration 
might be given to the investment in basic 
first aid training for all year 5 school children, 
at a cost of around $10 million annually. This 
should be pursued in partnership with all 
levels of government and the providers of first 
aid services.
A Spanish policeman walks past a hole blasted through a train in an explosion at Madrid’s Atocha train station after an explosion March 11, 2004. 
Simultaneous explosions killed at least 173 people on packed rush-hour trains in Madrid in pre-election attacks. © Andrea Comas/Reuters/Picture Media
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organisations may provide immediate 
practical assistance. The aim of the recovery 
phase is to restore the affected area to 
its previous state. These efforts involve 
rebuilding destroyed property, mitigating 
trauma, communicating about the progress 
of recovery, resuming business operations 
and repairing essential infrastructure.
5 See Transform. The Resilient Economy: 
Integrating Competitiveness and Security, 
US Council on Competitiveness 2007; 
Yossi Sheffi The Resilient Enterprise, MIT 
Press, Massachusetts, 2005. For a discussion 
of resilience in one sector see Anthony 
Bergin and Raspal Khosa, Terrorism and the 
Australian tourism industry, Policy Analysis, 
ASPI, February 2008.
6 Such an event could be of sudden impact 
or a sustained impact over an extended 
timeframe.
7 See Matthias Traub, David A Bradt and 
Anthony P Joseph 2007 ‘The surge capacity 
for people in emergencies (SCOPE) study in 
Australasian hospitals’, Medical Journal of 
Australia, 186 (8): 394–398; Anthony Bergin 
and Raspal Khosa Are we ready? Healthcare 
preparedness for catastrophic terrorism 
Special Report, ASPI, April 2007.
8 See Traub, Bradt and Joseph, note 7.
9 The Canberra and Eyre Peninsular fires of 
2003 and 2005, for example, took over three 
years to report.
10 Cottesloe Council in Perth, for example, 
fears that storms in the coming decades 
could wash away the beach and cause 
major damage to infrastructure.  
http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2008/
s2215033.htm
11 Reports covering national hospital audits, 
national aero-medivac capabilities and 
Australia’s ability to respond and recover 
from catastrophic disasters fall into 
this category.
12 National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom Cabinet Office, March 2008 p. 43. 
The United Kingdom established the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat in 2001 to play 
of potential shocks, systems failures, extreme 
natural hazards and terrorism.
In the face of mega disasters an important 
component of resilience is an informed and 
prepared community. In this sense, resilience 
involves engaging communities by helping 
them help themselves.
Most Australians are unlikely to find 
themselves the victims of a terrorist attack, 
but many Australians will face the risks 
posed by a natural hazard, agricultural or 
health crisis, or a significant failure in our 
critical infrastructure, such as power or 
water. And given the environmental impacts 
of climate change the odds will rise as far 
as natural disasters are concerned: limiting 
loss by a resilient community will become an 
increasingly important focus of public policy.
Building a more resilient Australian society 
should be a core national policy objective.
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1 At least 1,836 people lost their lives in 
Hurricane Katrina and in the subsequent 
floods. More than a million people were 
displaced and it’s estimated that it caused 
over US$81 billion in damages. Australians, 
along with others, were reminded of nature’s 
fury when the Indian Ocean tsunami took 
more than a quarter of a million lives and left 
many destitute in December 2004.
2 National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom, Cabinet Office, March 2008, p. 15
3 The majority of funding here being health 
protection measures and pharmaceutical 
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required. Volunteers and non-governmental 
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Sun Herald, 13 April 2008.
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May 2007.
14 There is the Commonwealth Government 
Disaster Response plan (COMDISPLAN) that 
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mechanisms: it doesn’t, however, detail 
the precise national authorities, roles and 
responsibilities in a major disaster. At the 
March 2008 meeting of the Ministerial 
Council for Police and Emergency 
Management, the Council endorsed draft 
Australian Emergency Management 
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emergency management arrangements 
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cooperative framework to counter-terrorism 
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territory governments.
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Attorney-General’s Department and 
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officers of state emergency management 
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Local Government Association and the 
Director General of Emergency Management 
Australia. It considers strategic policy 
and operational priorities, including 
planned exercises.
17 Tony Pearce, ‘All hazards planning for 
Australia’s security’ speech to Security in 
Government Conference 2007. The same 
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interim report on the unprecedented floods 
that occurred in the UK in 2007. Learning 
Lessons from the 2007 floods: an Independent 
Review, 17 December 2007, available from the 
UK cabinet office website.
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related to training and deployments.
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The strategy would also need to consider 
employee protection arrangements in the 
context of the impact of short notice release 
of employees on employers.
33 Critical infrastructure owners and operators 
have provided sensitive information and have 
done so because they believe in the value 
that CIPMA will return as models mature and 
become available for sector tasking.
34 Some jurisdictions have concluded 
arrangements with the ABC.
35 ABC Local Radio aims to provide an 
emergency warning service throughout 
Australia and can do so reliably from 
0600–2200 Monday–Friday and 0600–1800 
on weekends in all states and territories. 
Outside these hours South Australia, 
Northern Territory, and Western Australia 
(and in summer Queensland and Tasmania) 
can’t provide immediate warnings as 
they are broadcasting ‘in delay’. It takes 
20–40 minutes to interrupt the programs, 
depending on how soon a staff member can 
get into their offices to make the switches. 
This means places like the west coast 
which is vulnerable to a tsunami and South 
Australia which is vulnerable to bushfires and 
earthquakes can’t be provided with urgent 
warnings outside these hours.
36 Costs are around $2,000 for a new home 
or $10,000 to retrofit an existing three 
bedroom home. Another example in fire 
prevention, that could be adopted nationally 
to build resilience in fire prone areas, is 
the NSW Community Fire Unit Program. 
These units protect property prior to the 
arrival of the fire service, when resources 
are stretched. After a fire front has passed 
through, they monitor and extinguish 
remaining remnant fires, releasing the fire 
service to move to areas of greater need.
37 www.pantrylist.com.au
incident. Community alerting, information 
and warning systems were felt to be 
inadequate by those impacted by the 
event. See Westpoint Chemical Fire Report 
to the Community, Office of the Emergency 
Services Commissioner, Victoria, March 2008.
25 VOIP (voice over internet protocols) 
technology is becoming of much greater 
importance so there will be challenges in 
reaching those who rely on internet access 
for all communications.
26 See Chris Abbott, An uncertain future 
law enforcement, national security and 
climate change, Oxford Research Group, 
January 2008.
27 Requests for ongoing Defence Assistance 
to the Civil Community (DACC) are made 
by authorised officials in each jurisdiction 
through EMA to the Attorney-General. There 
are quite separate arrangements which 
involve the use or potential of armed force 
under Defence Force Assistance to the Civil 
Authority (DFACA). See Andrew Smith and 
Anthony Bergin Australian domestic security: 
the role of Defence, Strategic Insight, ASPI, 
November 2006.
28 Limited ADF helicopter support has 
been utilised for fodder drops and 
people relocation during flooding and in 
some situations of support for bushfire 
suppression operations. Most of the aerial 
support provided by the ADF in bushfire 
containment has been fire spotting, 
inserting/deploying specialised firefighters 
and communications.
29 One of the key weaknesses in emergency 
response at state level is rapid damage 
assessment followed by effective 
information collation, analysis and 
intelligence distribution. A networked 
emergency management approach 
would allow all agencies to contribute to 
data collection.
30 The Federal Attorney-General’s Department 
has been working with business leaders to 
consider organisational resilience. The group 
is formulating an action plan which includes 
the development of a resilience standard.
Strategic Insights 23
© 2008 Unisys Corporation. 
Unisys is a registered trademark of Unisys Corporation.
www.securityunleashed.com
Security can no longer be viewed as a response to fear. It has 
to become a catalyst for achievement. One that enables you to be 
more innovative, competitive and more ambitious. From consulting 
to outsourcing to systems integration, Unisys Solutions for Secure 
Business Operations empower companies to leap without ever  
having to look back.
ONE STEP FORWARD. 
TWO STEPS FORWARD.
24 Taking a punch: Building a more resilient Australia
Z0
0 
33
43
0
RRP $5.00  ISSN 1449-3993
Important disclaimer
This publication is designed to provide 
accurate and authoritative information 
in relation to the subject matter covered. 
It is provided with the understanding that 
the publisher is not engaged in rendering 
any form of professional or other advice 
or services. No person should rely on 
the contents of this publication without 
first obtaining advice from a qualified 
professional person.
About the authors
David Templeman completed six years 
(2000–2006) as Director General of 
Emergency Management Australia (DGEMA), 
the Federal Government’s agency with 
responsibility for reducing the impact of 
natural, technological and human-caused 
disasters on the Australian community. 
As DGEMA, he was a member of the 
Australian Health Protection Committee, 
the National Counter Terrorism Committee, 
the Critical Infrastructure Advisory 
Council and the Australian Emergency 
Management Committee.
David played a central role in the whole 
of government response to many major 
emergencies in Australia and the region, 
including bushfires, extreme storms, cyclones, 
earthquakes and floods, including critical 
infrastructure failures. He also coordinated 
the Australian Government’s emergency 
management response to international crises 
such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United 
States; the Bali, Madrid and Jakarta embassy 
bombings; Australia’s response to the tsunami 
in Southeast Asia and the London bombings 
in 2005. David contributed to national 
health emergency planning issues such as 
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
epidemic in 2003, and more recently Avian Flu 
pandemic arrangements.
David is now the Chief Executive of a national 
peak not-for-profit organisation in community 
services and preventive heath. He is a senior 
volunteer member of St John Ambulance 
Australia combined with other advisory roles 
in security and emergency management.
Anthony Bergin is the Director of Research 
Programs for ASPI. He is responsible for 
the Institute’s research and publications 
programs on defence and international 
security issues. Dr Bergin’s training is in law 
and political science. He was most recently an 
Associate Professor at the University of NSW, 
Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). 
From 1991–2003 he was the Director of the 
Australian Defence Studies Centre. Whilst 
at ADFA, he introduced the first Australian 
graduate course on Australian homeland 
security. He has written extensively on a 
wide range of national security issues and is a 
regular contributor to the media.
Dr Bergin’s recent papers at ASPI have 
included Are we ready? Healthcare 
preparedness for catastrophic terrorism; 
Australian domestic security: the role of 
Defence; Responding to radical Islamist 
ideology: The case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Australia; 
Confronting the terrorism threat: A national 
research institute for counter-terrorism; 
Australian universities and terrorism; The 
Australian media and terrorism; A change in 
climate for the Australian Defence Force and 
Advancing Australian homeland security: 
Leveraging the private sector.
About Strategic Insights
Strategic Insights are shorter studies intended 
to provide expert perspectives on topical 
policy issues. They reflect the personal views 
of the author(s), and do not in any way 
express or reflect the views of the Australian 
Government or represent the formal position 
of ASPI on any particular issue.
ASPI 
Tel +61 2 6270 5100 
Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 
Email enquiries@aspi.org.au 
Web www.aspi.org.au
© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
Limited 2008
This publication is subject to copyright. Except as 
permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part 
of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, 
mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording 
or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted without prior written 
permission. Enquiries should be addressed to 
the publishers.
